A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation by Perolat, Julien et al.
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of
common-pool resource appropriation
Julien Perolat∗
DeepMind
London, UK
perolat@google.com
Joel Z. Leibo∗
DeepMind
London, UK
jzl@google.com
Vinicius Zambaldi
DeepMind
London, UK
vzambaldi@google.com
Charles Beattie
DeepMind
London, UK
cbeattie@google.com
Karl Tuyls
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK
karltuyls@google.com
Thore Graepel
DeepMind
London, UK
thore@google.com
Abstract
Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This
class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable
use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems.
Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative
game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially
positive equilibria—a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However,
in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable
cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought
to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible. Most of that work
was based on laboratory experiments where participants only make a single choice:
how much to appropriate. Recognizing the importance of spatial and temporal
resource dynamics, a recent trend has been toward experiments in more complex
real-time video game-like environments. However, standard methods of non-
cooperative game theory can no longer be used to generate predictions for this case.
Here we show that deep reinforcement learning can be used instead. To that end,
we study the emergent behavior of groups of independently learning agents in a
partially observed Markov game modeling common-pool resource appropriation.
Our experiments highlight the importance of trial-and-error learning in common-
pool resource appropriation and shed light on the relationship between exclusion,
sustainability, and inequality.
1 Introduction
Natural resources like fisheries, groundwater basins, and grazing pastures, as well as technological
resources like irrigation systems and access to geosynchronous orbit are all common-pool resources
(CPRs). It is difficult or impossible for agents to exclude one another from accessing them. But
whenever an agent obtains an individual benefit from such a resource, the remaining amount available
for appropriation by others is ever-so-slightly diminished. These two seemingly-innocent properties
of CPRs combine to yield numerous subtle problems of motivation in organizing collective action [12,
26, 27, 6]. The necessity of organizing groups of humans for effective CPR appropriation, combined
with its notorious difficulty, has shaped human history. It remains equally critical today.
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Renewable natural resources† have a stock component and a flow component [10, 35, 7, 26]. Agents
may choose to appropriate resources from the flow. However, the magnitude of the flow depends
on the state of the stock‡. Over-appropriation negatively impacts the stock, and thus has a negative
impact on future flow. Agents secure individual rewards when they appropriate resource units from a
CPR. However, the cost of such appropriation, felt via its impact on the CPR stock, affects all agents
in the community equally. Economic theory predicts that as long as each individual’s share of the
marginal social cost is less than their marginal gain from appropriating an additional resource unit,
agents will continue to appropriate from the CPR. If such over-appropriation continues unchecked for
too long then the CPR stock may become depleted, thus cutting off future resource flows. Even if an
especially clever agent were to realize the trap, they still could not unilaterally alter the outcome by
restraining their own behavior. In other words, CPR appropriation problems have socially-deficient
Nash equilibria. In fact, the choice to appropriate is typically dominant over the choice to show
restraint (e.g. [32]). No matter what the state of the CPR stock, agents prefer to appropriate additional
resources for themselves over the option of showing restraint, since in that case they receive no
individual benefit but still endure the cost of CPR exploitation by others.
(a) Open map
(b) Small map with agent’s observation
Figure 1: (a) The initial state of the
commons game at the start of each
episode on the large open map used in
sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5. Apples are
green, walls are grey, and players are
red or blue. (b) The initial state of the
small map used for the single-agent ex-
periment (Section 3.1). The size of the
window of pixels a player receives as
an observation is also shown.
Nevertheless, despite such pessimistic theoretical predictions,
human communities frequently are able to self-organize to solve
CPR appropriation problems [26, 28, 27, 6]. A major goal of
laboratory-based behavioral work in this area is to determine
what it is about human behavior that makes this possible. Be-
ing based on behavioral game theory [4], most experimental
work on human CPR appropriation behavior features highly
abstracted environments where the only decision to make is
how much to appropriate (e.g. [29]). The advantage of such
a setup is that the theoretical predictions of non-cooperative
game theory are clear. However, this is achieved by sacrificing
the opportunity to model spatial and temporal dynamics which
are important in real-world CPRs [26]. This approach also
downplays the role of trial-and-error learning.
One recent line of behavioral research on CPR appropriation
features significantly more complex environments than the ab-
stract matrix games that came before [16, 18, 17, 14, 15]. In
a typical experiment, a participant controls the movements of
an on-screen avatar in a real-time video game-like environment
that approximates a CPR with complex spatial and temporal
dynamics. They are compensated proportionally to the amount
of resources they collect. Interesting behavioral results have
been obtained with this setup. For example, [18] found that
participants often found cooperative solutions that relied on
dividing the CPR into separate territories. However, due to
the increased complexity of the environment model used in
this new generation of experiments, the standard tools of non-
cooperative game theory can no longer be used to generate
predictions.
We propose a new model of common-pool resource appropriation in which learning takes the center
stage. It consists of two components: (1) a spatially and temporally dynamic CPR environment,
similar to [17], and (2) a multi-agent system consisting of N independent self-interested deep
reinforcement learning agents. On the collective level, the idea is that self-organization to solve
CPR appropriation problems works by smoothly adjusting over time the incentives felt by individual
agents through a process akin to trial and error. This collective adjustment process is the aggregate
result of all the many individual agents simultaneously learning how best to respond to their current
situation.
†Natural resources may or may not be renewable. However, this paper is only concerned with those that are.
‡CPR appropriation problems are concerned with the allocation of the flow. In contrast, CPR provision
problems concern the supply of the stock. This paper only addresses the appropriation problem and we will say
no more about CPR provision. See [7, 26] for more on the distinction between the two problems.
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This model of CPR appropriation admits a diverse range of emergent social outcomes. Much of the
present paper is devoted to developing methodology for analyzing such emergence. For instance,
we show how behavior of groups may be characterized along four social outcome metrics called:
efficiency, equality, sustainability, and peace. We also develop an N -player empirical game-theoretic
analysis that allows one to connect our model back to standard non-cooperative game theory. It
allows one to determine classical game-theoretic properties like Nash equilibria for strategic games
that emerge from learning in our model.
Our point is not to argue that we have a more realistic model than standard non-cooperative game
theory. This is also a reductionist model. However, it emphasizes different aspects of real-world CPR
problems. It makes different assumptions and thus may be expected to produce new insights for the
general theory of CPR appropriation that were missed by the existing literature’s focus on standard
game theory models. Our results are broadly compatible with previous theory while also raising a
new possibility, that trial-and-error learning may be a powerful mechanism for promoting sustainable
use of the commons.
2 Modeling and analysis methods
2.1 The commons game
The goal of the commons game is to collect “apples” (resources). The catch is that the apple regrowth
rate (i.e. CPR flow) depends on the spatial configuration of the uncollected apples (i.e the CPR stock):
the more nearby apples, the higher the regrowth rate. If all apples in a local area are harvested then
none ever grow back—until the end of the episode (1000 steps), at which point the game resets to
an initial state. The dilemma is as follows. The interests of the individual lead toward harvesting as
rapidly as possible. However, the interests of the group as a whole are advanced when individuals
refrain from doing so, especially in situations where many agents simultaneously harvest in the same
local region. Such situations are precarious because the more harvesting agents there are, the greater
the chance of bringing the local stock down to zero, at which point it cannot recover.
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(a) Single agent return
(b) Optimal path
Figure 2: (a) Single-agent returns as
a function of training steps. (b) The
optimal resource appropriation policy
for a single agent on this map. At con-
vergence, the agent we study nearly
learns this policy: https://youtu.
be/NnghJgsMxAY.
So far, the proposed commons game is quite similar to
the dynamic game used in human behavioral experiments
[16, 18, 17, 14, 15]. However, it departs in one notable way. In
the behavioral work, especially [17], participants were given
the option of paying a fee in order to fine another participant,
reducing their score. In contrast, in our commons game, agents
can tag one another with a “time-out beam”. Any agent caught
in the path of the beam is removed from the game for 25 steps.
Neither the tagging nor the tagged agent receive any direct
reward or punishment from this. However, the tagged agent
loses the chance to collect apples during its time-out period and
the tagging agent loses a bit of time chasing and aiming, thus
paying the opportunity cost of foregone apple consumption. We
argue that such a mechanism is more realistic because it has an
effect within the game itself, not just on the scores.
The commons game is a partially-observable general-sum
Markov Game [33, 22]. In each state of the game, agents
take actions based on a partial observation of the state space
and receive an individual reward. Agents must learn through
experience an appropriate behavior policy while interacting
with one another.
In technical terms, we consider an N -player partially observ-
able Markov game M defined on a finite set of states S.
The observation function O : S × {1, . . . , N} → Rd speci-
fies each player’s d-dimensional view on the state space. In
any state, players are allowed to take actions from the set
A1, . . . ,AN (one for each player). As a result of their joint
action a1, . . . , aN ∈ A1, . . . ,AN the state changes following
the stochastic transition function T : S ×A1 × · · · × AN → ∆(S) (where ∆(S) denotes the set of
discrete probability distributions over S) and every player receives an individual reward defined as
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ri : S ×A1 × · · · × AN → R for player i. Finally, let us write Oi = {oi | s ∈ S, oi = O(s, i)} be
the observation space of player i.
Each agent learns, independently through their own experience of the environment, a behavior policy
pii : Oi → ∆(Ai) (written pi(ai|oi)) based on their own observation oi = O(s, i) and reward
ri(s, a1, . . . , aN ). For the sake of simplicity we will write ~a = (a1, . . . , aN ), ~o = (o1, . . . , oN )
and ~pi(.|~o) = (pi1(.|o1), . . . , piN (.|oN )). Each agent’s goal is to maximize a long term γ-discounted
payoff defined as follow:
V i~pi(s0) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtri(st,~at)|~at ∼ ~pit, st+1 ∼ T (st,~at)
]
2.2 Deep multi-agent reinforcement learning
Multi-agent learning in Markov games is the subject of a large literature [3], mostly concerned with
the aim of prescribing an optimal learning rule. To that end, many algorithms have been proposed
over the past decade to provide guarantees of convergence in specific settings. Some of them address
the zero-sum two-player case [22], or attempt to solve the general-sum case [13, 11]. Others study
the emergence of cooperation in partially observable Markov decision processes [9, 37, 38] but rely
on knowledge of the model which is unrealistic when studying independent interaction. Our goal, as
opposed to the prescriptive agenda, is to describe the behaviour that emerges when agents learn in the
presence of other learning agents. This agenda is called the descriptive agenda in the categorization
of Shoham & al. [34]. To that end, we simulated N independent agents, each simultaneously learning
via the deep reinforcement learning algorithm of Mnih et al. (2015) [24].
Reinforcement learning algorithms learn a policy through experience balancing exploration of the
environment and exploitation. These algorithms were developed for the single agent case and
are applied independently here [21, 3] even though this multi-agent context breaks the Markov
assumption [20]. The algorithm we use is Q-learning with function approximation (i.e. DQN) [24].
In Q-learning, the policy of agent i is implicitly represented through a state-action value function
Qi(O(s, i), a) (also written Qi(s, a) in the following). The policy of agent i is an -greedy policy
and is defined by pii(a|O(s, i)) = (1 − )1a=argmax
a
Qi(s,a) +

|Ai| . The parameter  controls the
amount of exploration. The Q-function Qi is learned to minimize the bellman residual ‖Qi(oi, ai)−
ri −max
b
Qi(o′i, b)‖ on data collected through interaction with the environment (oi, ai, ri, o′i) in
{(oit, ait, rit, oit+1)} (where oit = O(st, i)).
2.3 Social outcome metrics
Unlike in single-agent reinforcement learning where the value function is the canonical metric of
agent performance, in multi-agent systems with mixed incentives like the commons game, there is no
scalar metric that can adequately track the state of the system (see e.g. [5]). Thus we introduce four
key social outcome metrics in order to summarize group behavior and facilitate its analysis.
Consider N independent agents. Let {rit | t = 1, . . . , T} be the sequence of rewards obtained by
the i-th agent over an episode of duration T . Likewise, let {oit | t = 1, . . . T} be the i-th agent’s
observation sequence. Its return is given by Ri =
∑T
t=1 r
i
t.
The Utilitarian metric (U ), also known as Efficiency, measures the sum total of all rewards obtained
by all agents. It is defined as the average over players of sum of rewards Ri. The Equality metric
(E) is defined using the Gini coefficient [8]. The Sustainability metric (S) is defined as the average
time at which the rewards are collected. The Peace metric (P ) is defined as the average number of
untagged agent steps.
U = E
[∑N
i=1R
i
T
]
, E = 1−
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |Ri −Rj |
2N
∑N
i=1R
i
, S = E
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
ti
]
where ti = E[t | rit > 0].
P =
E
[
NT −∑Ni=1∑Tt=1 I(oit)]
T
where I(o) =
{
1 if o = time-out observation
0 otherwise.
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3 Results
3.1 Sustainable appropriation in the single-agent case
In principle, even a single agent, on its own, may learn a strategy that over-exploits and depletes its
own private resources. However, in the single-agent case, such a strategy could always be improved
by individually adopting a more sustainable strategy. We find that, in practice, agents are indeed able
to learn an efficient and sustainable appropriation policy in the single-agent case (Fig. 2).
3.2 Emergent social outcomes
Now we consider the multi-agent case. Unlike in the single agent case where learning steadily
improved returns (Fig. 2-a), in the multi-agent case, learning does not necessarily increase returns.
The returns of a single agent are also a poor indicator of the group’s behavior. Thus we monitor how
the social outcome metrics that we defined in Section 2.3 evolve over the course of training (Fig. 3).
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Figure 3: Evolution of the different social out-
come metrics (Sec.2.3) over the course of training
on the open map (Fig.1a) using a time-out beam
of length 10 and width 5. From top to bottom is
displayed, the utility metric (U ), the sustainability
metric (S), the equality metric (E), and the peace
metric (P ).
The system moves through 3 phases characterized by
qualitatively different behaviors and social outcomes.
Phase 1, which we may call naïvety, begins at the
start of training and extends until ≈ 900 episodes.
It is characterized by healthy CPR stocks (high ap-
ple density). Agents begin training by acting ran-
domly, diffusing through the space and collecting
apples whenever they happen upon them. Apples
density is high enough that the overall utilitarian ef-
ficiency (U) is quite high, and in fact is close to the
max it will ever attain. As training progresses, agents
learn to move toward regions of greater apple density
in order to more efficiently harvest rewards. They de-
tect no benefit from their tagging action and quickly
learn not to use it. This can be seen as a steady in-
crease in the peace metric (P ) (Fig. 3). In a video§
of typical agent behavior in the naïvety phase, it can
be seen that apples remain plentiful (the CPR stock
remains healthy) throughout the entire episode.
Phase 2, which we may call tragedy, begins where
naïvety ends (≈ episode 900), it is characterized by
rapid and catastrophic depletion of CPR stock in each
episode. The sustainability metric (S), which had
already been decreasing steadily with learning in the
previous phase, now takes a sudden and drastic turn
downward. It happens because agents have learned
“too well” how to appropriate from the CPR. With
each agent harvesting as quickly as they possibly can,
no time is allowed for the CPR stock to recover. It
quickly becomes depleted. As a result, utilitarian
efficiency (U) declines precipitously. At the low
point, agents are collecting less than half as many
apples per episode as they did at the very start of
training—when they were acting randomly (Fig. 3).
In a video¶ of agent play at the height of the tragedy
one can see that by ≈ 500 steps into the (1100-step)
episode, the stock has been completely depleted and
no more apples can grow.
Phase 3, which we may call maturity, begins when ef-
ficiency and sustainability turn the corner and start to
recover again after their low point (≈ episode 1500)
and continues indefinitely. Initially, conflict breaks
out when agents discover that, in situations of great
§learned policy after 100 episodes https://youtu.be/ranlu_9ooDw.
¶learned policy after 1100 episodes https://youtu.be/1xF1DoLxqyQ.
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apple scarcity, it is possible to tag another agent to prevent them from taking apples that one could
otherwise take for themselves. As learning continues, this conflict expands in scope. Agents learn
to tag one another in situations of greater and greater abundance. The peace metric (P ) steadily
declines (Fig. 3). At the same time, efficiency (U) and sustainability (S) increase, eventually
reaching and slightly surpassing their original level from before tragedy struck. How can efficiency
and sustainability increase while peace declines? When an agent is tagged by another agent’s beam,
it gets removed from the game for 25 steps. Conflict between agents in the commons game has the
effect of lowering the effective population size and thus relieving pressure on the CPR stock. With
less agents harvesting at any given time, the survivors are free to collect with greater impunity and
less risk of resource depletion. This effect is evident in a video‖ of agent play during the maturity
phase. Note that the CPR stock is maintained through the entire episode. By contrast, in an analogous
experiment with the tagging action disabled, the learned policies were much less sustainable (Supp.
Fig. 11).
taggers
non-taggers
(a) Territorial effect
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(b) Histogram of the equality metric on the territory maps
Figure 4: (a) Scatter plot of return by range size (variance of position) for individual agents in experiments with
one tagging agent (red dots, one per random seed) and 11 non-tagging agents (blue dots, eleven per random
seed). The tagging players collect more apples per episode than the others and remain in a smaller part of the
map. This illustrates that the tagging players take over a territory and harvest sustainably within its boundary.
(b) represents the distribution of the equality metric (E) for different runs on four different maps with natural
regions from which it may be possible to exclude other. The first map is the standard map from which others will
be derived (Fig. 6c). In the second apples are more concentrated on the top left corner and will respawn faster
(Fig. 6d). the third is porous meaning it is harder for an agent to protect an area (Fig 6e). On the fourth map, the
interiors walls are removed (Fig. 6f). Figure 4b shows inequality rises in maps where players can exclude one
another from accessing the commons.
3.3 Sustainability and the emergence of exclusion
Suppose, by building a fence around the resource or some other means, access to it can be made
exclusive to just one agent. Then that agent is called the owner and the resource is called a private
good [30]. The owner is incentivized to avoid over-appropriation so as to safeguard the value of
future resource flows from which they and they alone will profit. In accord with this, we showed
above (Fig. 2) that sustainability can indeed be achieved in the single agent case. Next, we wanted to
see if such a strategy could emerge in the multi-agent case.
The key requirement is for agents to somehow be able to exclude one another from accessing part of
the CPR, i.e. a region of the map. To give an agent the chance to exclude others we had to provide it
with an advantage. Thus we ran an experiment where only one out of the twelve agents could use
the tagging action. In this experiment, the tagging agent learned a policy of controlling a specific
territory by using its time-out beam to exclude other agents from accessing it. The tagging agents
roam over a smaller part of the map than the non-tagging agents but achieve better returns (Fig. 4a).
This is because the non-tagging agents generally failed to organize a sustainable appropriation pattern
‖learned policy after 3900 episodes https://youtu.be/XZXJYgPuzEI.
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All players
L: taggers
R: non-taggers
number of non-taggers
(a) Early training (after 500 episodes) Schelling dia-
gram for L = taggers and R = non-taggers
All players
L: taggers
R: non-taggers
number of non-taggers
(b) Late training (after 3000 episodes) Schelling dia-
gram for L = taggers and R = non-taggers
Figure 5: Schelling diagram from early (5a) and late (5b) in training for the experiment where L = taggers and
R = non-taggers.
and depleted the CPR stock in the area available to them (the majority of the map). The tagging agent,
on the other hand, was generally able to maintain a healthy stock within its “privatized” territory∗∗.
Interestingly, territorial solutions to CPR appropriation problems have emerged in real-world CPR
problems, especially fisheries [23, 1, 36]. Territories have also emerged spontaneously in laboratory
experiments with a spatially and temporally dynamic commons game similar to the one we study
here [18].
3.4 Emergence of inequality
To further investigate the emergence of exclusion strategies using agents that all have the same
abilities (all can tag), we created four new maps with natural regions enclosed by walls (see Supp.
Fig. 6). The idea is that it is much easier to exclude others from accessing a territory that has only a
single entrance than one with multiple entrances or one with no walls at all. This manipulation had a
large effect on the equality of outcomes. Easier exclusion led to greater inequality (Fig. 4b). The
lucky agent that was first to learn how to exclude others from “its territory” could then monopolize
the lion’s share of the rewards for a long time (Supp. Figs. 7a and 7b). In one map with unequal
apple density between the four regions, the other agents were never able to catch up and achieve
returns comparable to the first-to-learn agent (Supp. Fig. 7b). On the other hand, on the maps where
exclusion was more difficult, there was no such advantage to being the first to learn (Supp. Figs. 7c
and 7d).
3.5 Empirical game-theoretic analysis of emergent strategic incentives
We use empirical game theoretic analysis to characterize the strategic incentives facing agents at
different points over the course of training. As in [21], we use simulation to estimate the payoffs of an
abstracted game in which agents choose their entire policy as a single decision with two alternatives.
However, the method of [21] cannot be applied directly to the case of N > 2 players that we study in
this paper. Instead, we look at Schelling diagrams [32]. They provide an intuitive way to summarize
the strategic structure of a symmetric N -player 2-action game where everyone’s payoffs depend only
on the number of others choosing one way or the other. Following Schelling’s terminology, we refer
to the two alternatives as L and R (left and right). We include in the appendix several examples of
Schelling diagrams produced from experiments using different ways of assigning policies to L and R
groups (Supp. Fig. 8).
∗∗A typical episode where the tagging agent has a policy of excluding others from a region in the lower left
corner of the map: https://youtu.be/3iGnpijQ8RM.
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In this section we restrict our attention to an experiment where L is the choice of adopting a policy
that uses the tagging action and R the choice of a policy that does not tag. A Schelling diagram
is interpreted as follows. The green curve is the average return obtained by a player choosing L
(a tagger) as a function of the number of players choosing R (non-taggers). Likewise, the red
curve is the average return obtained by a player choosing R as a function of the number of other
players also choosing R. The average return of all players is shown in blue. At the leftmost point,
|R| = 0 =⇒ |L| = N , the blue curve must coincide with the green one. At the rightmost point,
|R| = N =⇒ |L| = 0, the blue curve coincides with the red curve.
Properties of the strategic game can be read off from the Schelling diagram. For example, in Fig. 5b
one can see that the choice of a tagging policy is dominant over the choice of a non-tagging policy
since, for any |R|, the expected return of the L group is always greater than that of the R group.
This implies that the Nash equilibrium is at |R| = 0 (all players tagging). The Schelling diagram
also shows that the collective maximum (blue curve’s max) occurs when |R| = 7. So the Nash
equilibrium is socially-deficient in this case.
In addition to being able to describe the strategic game faced by agents at convergence, we can also
investigate how the strategic incentives agents evolve over the course of learning. Fig. 5a shows that
the strategic game after 500 training episodes is one with a uniform negative externality. That is, no
matter whether one is a tagger or a non-tagger, the effect of switching one additional other agent from
the tagging group to the non-tagging group is to decrease returns. After 3000 training episodes the
strategic situation is different (Fig. 5b). Now, for |R| > 5, there is a contingent externality. Switching
one additional agent from tagging to non-tagging has a positive effect on the remaining taggers and a
negative effect on the non-taggers (green and red curves have differently signed slopes).
4 Discussion
This paper describes how algorithms arising from reinforcement learning research may be applied
to build new kinds of models for phenomena drawn from the social sciences. As such, this paper
really has two audiences. For social scientists, the core conclusions are as follows. (1) Unlike most
game theory-based approaches where modelers typically “hand engineer” specific strategies like
tit-for-tat [2] or win-stay-lose-shift [25], here agents must learn how to implement their strategic
decisions. This means that the resulting behaviors are emergent. For example, in this case the tragedy
of the commons was “solved” by reducing the effective population size below the environment’s
carrying capacity, but this outcome was not assumed. (2) This model endogenizes exclusion. That is,
it allows agents to learn strategies wherein they exclude others from a portion of the CPR. Then, in
accord with predictions from economics [26, 1, 18, 36], sustainable appropriation strategies emerge
more readily in the “privatized” zones than they do elsewhere. (3) Inequality emerges when exclusion
policies are easier to implement. In particular, natural boundaries in the environment make inequality
more likely to arise.
From the perspective of reinforcement learning research, the most interesting aspect of this model is
that—despite the fact that all agents learn only toward their individual objectives—tracking individual
rewards over the course of training is insufficient to characterize the state of the system. These results
illustrate how multiple simultaneously learning agents may continually improve in “competence”
without improving their expected discounted returns. Indeed, learning may even decrease returns in
cases where too-competent agents end up depleting the commons. Without the social outcome metrics
(efficiency, equality, sustainability, and peace) and other analyses employed here, such emergent
events could not have been detected. This insight is widely applicable to other general-sum Markov
games with mixed incentives (e.g. [19, 21]).
This is a reductionist approach. Notice what is conspicuously absent from the model we have
proposed. The process by which groups of humans self-organize to solve CPR problems is usually
conceptualized as one of rational negotiation (e.g. [26]). People do things like bargain with one
another, attempt to build consensus for collective decisions, think about each other’s thoughts, and
make arbitration appeals to local officials. The agents in our model can’t do anything like that.
Nevertheless, we still find it is sometimes possible for self-organization to resolve CPR appropriation
problems. Moreover, examining the pattern of success and failure across variants of our model
yields insights that appear readily applicable to understanding human CPR appropriation behavior.
The question then is raised: how much of human cognitive sophistication is really needed to find
adequate solutions to CPR appropriation problems? We note that nonhuman organisms also solve
them [31]. This suggests that trial-and-error learning alone, without advanced cognitive capabilities
may sometimes be sufficient for effective CPR appropriation.
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Appendix
A Simulation methods
The partially-observed Markov game environment underlying our implementation of the commons game is a 2D
grid-world game engine. It works as follows. The state st and the joint action of all players ~a determine the
state at the next time-step st+1. Observations O(s, i) ∈ R3×20×21 (RGB) of the true state st depend on the i-th
player’s current position and orientation. The observation window extends 20 grid squares ahead and 10 grid
squares from side to side (see Fig. 1). Actions a ∈ R8 were agent-centered: step forward, step backward, step
left, step right, rotate left, rotate right, tag, and stand still. The beam extends 20 grid squares in the direction
faced by the tagger. It is 5 squares wide. If another agent is in the path of the beam then it is tagged. A tagged
agent is removed from the game for 25 timesteps. Being tagged has no direct impact on rewards. However,
there is an indirect effect since a tagged agent cannot collect apples during its time-out period. Each player
appears blue in its own local view and red in its opponent’s view. Each episode lasted for 1, 000 steps. The local
flow of apple respawning depends on local stock size. Specifically, the per-timestep respawn probability pt of a
potential apple at position c depends on the number of already-spawned apples in a ball of radius 2 centered
around its location, i.e. the local stock size L = |{already-spawned apples ∈ B2(c)}. The per-timestep respawn
probability as a function of local stock size is given by:
pt(L) =

0 if L = 0
0.01 if L = 1 or 2
0.05 if L = 3 or 4
0.1 if L > 4
(1)
Default neural networks had two hidden layers with 32 units, interleaved with rectified linear layers which
projected to the output layer which had 8 units, one for each action. During training, players implemented
epsilon-greedy policies, with epsilon decaying linearly over time (from 1.0 to 0.1). The default per-time-step
discount rate γ was 0.99.
(a) Small map (b) Open map
(c) Basic single-entrance region
map
(d) Unequal single-entrance region
map (e) Multi-entrance region map (f) Region map with no walls
Figure 6: We used six different maps in our experiments. Map 6a is a small environment where a single random
player will sometimes harvest all the apples. Map 6b is considerably larger. It was designed so that a single
agent, acting alone cannot remove all the apples but with several agents harvesting simultaneously it becomes
relatively easy to remove them all. Maps 6c, 6e, and 6f were constructed in order to manipulate the ease with
which agents can exclude one another from accessing territories defined by natural boundaries (walls). They
were designed to be compared to one another. Thus all three have the same number and spatial configuration
of apples. Map 6c has only one single entrance to each region. Map 6e has two additional entrances to each
region and in map 6f, all walls were removed. Map 6d was created to test the effects of territories with unequal
productivity. In its top left corner region, the apples are placed closer to one another than in the other regions.
Thus, since the growth rule is density dependent, apples respawn faster in this region (greater CPR flow).
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(a) Basic single-entrance region map (6c)
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(b) Unequal single-entrance region map (6d)
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(c) Multi-entrance region map (6e)
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(d) Region map with no walls (6f)
Figure 7: These figures shows how inequality emerges and persists on different maps. In this experiment, 12
players learns simultaneously on maps 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f. In each plot, the red time series shows reward as a
function of training time for the agent that was most successful in the first 1000 episodes (before the vertical red
dashed line). The aim of this analysis was to determine whether an early advantage would persist over time.
That is, was the inequality persistent, with the same agent coming out on top in episode after episode? Or was it
more random, with different agents doing well in each episode? As expected from Fig. 4b, in the multi-entrance
and no-walls maps, this analysis shows no inequality. Interestingly, the two cases where inequality emerged are
different from one another. The advantage of the first-to-learn agent on the basic single-entrance map (6c) was
transient. However on the unequal single-entrance map (6d), its advantage was persistent.
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(a) Schelling diagram for fast and slow players
where L = fast and R = slow
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(b) Schelling diagram for players with small and
large γ where L = hight γ (γ = 0.99) and R =
low γ (γ = 0.9)
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(c) Schelling diagram for players
with small and large networks where
L = small network (hidden layer = (5)) and
R = large network (hidden layer = (32, 32))
All players
L: taggers
R: non-taggers
number of non-taggers
(d) Schelling diagram for tagging and non-tagging
players where L = taggers and R = non-taggers.
Figure 8: Schelling diagrams at convergence. Fig. 8a shows the interaction between fast and slow players,
Fig. 8b shows the interaction between players with large and small γ (γ = 0.9 or 0.99), Fig. 8c shows the
interaction between players with large and small neural network, and Fig. 8d shows the interaction between
players that have the ability to tag or not.
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Figure 9: Schelling diagrams during training for the experiment where L = taggers and R = non-taggers.
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Figure 10: Schelling diagrams during training for the experiment where L = fast and R = slow.
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Figure 11: Left: Evolution of the different social outcome metrics (Sec.2.3) over the course of training on the
open map (Fig.1a) for the case without the time-out beam tagging action. Right: the same figure from the main
text is reproduced for comparison. From top to bottom is displayed, the utilitarian efficiency metric (U ), the
sustainability metric (S), the equality metric (E), and the peace metric (P ). Notice that in the case without the
time-out beam, the final sustainability value is considerably lower than in the case with the time-out beam. This
means that agents frequently deplete their resources before the end of the episode in the conflict-free case.
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